BREEAM Security Needs Assessment

Summerland Street
Exeter

for

McLAREN
PROPERTY

24th March 2023

Hatari Global Solutions Ltd
Company Number: 11159946

Contents

Executive Summary

This report has been produced in response to a request from McLaren (Exeter) Limited for a Security Needs Assessment (SNA) in support of a BREEAM New Construction 2018 Hea 06 - Safety & Security credit relating to the construction of mixed-use accommodation on Summerland Street, Exeter.

Scope of Security Needs Assessment

This report presents the results of a SNA conducted for a new scheme at Summerland Street, Exeter, EX1 2AT. The project is referred to in this report as 'Summerland Street'.

The scope of the SNA is aligned to the scope of the project's BREEAM certification and therefore includes layout, construction, physical and electronic security installation. The client has a stated design ambition to achieve a BREEAM rating of 'Excellent'.

The scheme will not be seeking Secure by Design (SBD) certification however, by meeting the requirements set out in this SNA it will be able to demonstrate that SBD requirements have been adequately incorporated and may therefore consider applying for SBD certification later. Certification will be facilitated by engagement with the Devon and Cornwall Police Designing out Crime Officer (DOCO) during design and construction phases. The DOCO has been consulted during the production of this SNA.

The proposed redevelopment is for new co-living and build to rent (BTR) accommodation with a frontage along Summerland Street, also bordering Red Lion Lane and Verney Street in Exeter.

References and Guidelines

1. BREEAM New Construction 2018 Hea 06 - Safety & Security
2. 230210 Summerland Street Exeter Council Presentation (Stride Treglown)
3. Stride Treglown Design References:
    a. 154670-STL-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00002-P16-Proposed Site Plan
    b. 154670-STL-ZZ-00-DR-A-10000-P16-Proposed Ground Floor Plan
    c. 154670-STL-XX-XX-DR-A-S7000-P16-GIA Plans
4. Devon & Cornwall Police - Force DOCO Team Consultation
5. Secured by Design Homes guide and the Commercial guide

Risk Summary

Our assessment concludes that the most pertinent risks to Summerland Street are comparable to those of other mixed use, co-living developments in regional UK cities. Summerland Street's location within the boundaries of Exeter city centre, elevates its risk profile, particularly from threats associated with external sources of antisocial behaviour, sexual and violent crime, shoplifting, and other theft – see Annex A for an overview of local crime statistics.

Summerland Street plans to house 167 co-living residents and is aimed at young graduates, key workers, and young professionals. This assessment has considered the risks to property and personnel presented by the grouping of new co-living residents in an area of many student developments. This demographic is traditionally associated with higher-than-average prevalence of antisocial behaviour, crime, and violent and sexual offences. The proximity of Unit 1 (a nightclub) will elevate these risks during opening hours and at night. Furthermore, risks associated with petty crime will be high given the proximity to the high street and proliferation of high value goods such as laptops, mobile phones, TVs, and gaming consoles.

The development, therefore, requires a baseline set of security control measures to be considered through design, implemented through fit out phases and operated to provide a safe and secure environment for all Summerland Street staff, co-living occupants, and visitors.

Security risks from public protest are assessed as being extremely low. The site is not in the vicinity of buildings or institutions which might attract this type of activity.

Security risks to Summerland Street from terrorism are insignificant and have been discounted from design considerations in this report. Furthermore, it is assessed that the current neighbouring business and educational institutions do not represent an indirect threat from terrorism due to a similarly low likelihood of them being the target of terrorist related attacks. The profile of tenants and neighbours may change over time and as such should be monitored and re-evaluated to support operational mitigations.

Summary of Security Recommendations

This SNA has been developed following an assessment of security risks to the site, the conduct of a site survey and a review of the current architectural designs from Stride Treglown, including liaison with the Devon & Cornwall DOCO. These activities have informed a set of recommend security measures to support the design process.

Serial	Subject	Recommendation	Suggested Evidence
01	General	To provide a series of security control measures to the mixed accommodation and commercial scheme, restricting access, providing suitable levels of privacy, and creating clear separation with the co-living accommodation units.	Security Design consultant specifications or Security Contractor's proposal.
02	Access Control	To install electronic access control measures to manage access to the building by people, into and through the building, creating layers of security to protect restricted areas spaces, particularly Studio units and restricted back of house areas.	Security Design consultant specifications or Security Contractor's proposal.
03	Access Control	Provide electronic access control and suitable secure credentials to enable authorised access only to internal space	Security Design consultant specifications or Security Contractor's proposal.
04	Access Control	Design to consider security zoning, that segregation is enforced between all Summerland Street user groups – especially relating to access to and Studio accommodation	Security Design consultant specifications or Security Contractor's proposal.
05	Intercom	Intercom (preferable audio/visual) to be provided at principal entry points to the perimeter and buildings to support and authorise access for non-card holders (visitors, deliveries, non-residents)	Security Design consultant specifications or Security Contractor's proposal.
06	CCTV	Sufficient CCTV coverage as set out in the report to support surveillance of all building access points and restricted areas including access to the Cycle store	Security Design consultant specifications or Security Contractor's proposal.
07	CCTV	CCTV specification to be of sufficient quality to provide identification capability at perimeter entry points and doors to restricted areas, recording data to a minimum of 30 days	Security Design consultant specifications or Security Contractor's proposal.
08	CCTV	Provide appropriate CCTV signage to meet GDPR (General Data Protection Regulations) and Information Commissioners Office CCTV Code of practice requirements	Security Design consultant specifications or Security Contractor's proposal.
9	Building Façade	Provide laminated glass to accessible areas of the building's facade to a standard capable of providing a moderate level of resistance to forced entry.	Architect's facade design, Facade Contractor's proposal.
10	Main Entrances	Provide external access-controlled and security rated doors with electronic or electro-mechanical locks.	Certified to PAS 24:2022 (or equivalent LPS standard).
11	Other Controlled Doors	Provide security rated doors and locks to other building entry points and controlled internal doors, including access to all accommodation corridors.	Certified to PAS 24:2022 (or equivalent LPS standard).

12	Secure Storage	Provide security rated doors to any contained bike storage and refuse bin entrances. Provide rated locking facilities on bike racks.	Certified to PAS 24:2022 (or equivalent LPS standard).
13	Internal Doors	Provide lockable doors to the other locations listed in the report.	Architect's door schedule or Door Contractor's proposal.
14	Lighting	Ensure that pedestrian access routes are evenly illuminated with good colour rendition.	BS 5489-1:2020 Lighting of Roads and Public Amenity Areas.
15	Lighting	Ensure that refuse areas and any external recreational space are provided illumination with good colour rendition	BS 5489-1:2020 Lighting of Roads and Public Amenity Areas.

BREEAM NC 2018 Hea 06 Security Needs Assessment Requirements

"A Suitably Qualified Security Specialist (SQSS) conducts an evidence-based Security Needs Assessment (SNA) during or prior to Concept Design (RIBA Stage 2 or equivalent)"

- Alex Swanson from Hatari Global Solutions (Hatari) Ltd is the SQSS for this Security Needs Assessment.
- A full description of Hatari SQSS criteria is at Annex C.
- The SNA was completed in March 2023, during RIBA Stage 2.

"The SQSS develops a set of recommendations or solutions during or prior to Concept Design (RIBA Stage 2 or equivalent). These recommendations or solutions aim to ensure that the design of buildings, public and private car parks and public or amenity space are planned, designed, and specified to address the issues identified in the preceding SNA".

- Recommendations are described in the relevant section of this report.
- The SNA was completed in March 2023, during RIBA Stage 2.

"A visual audit of the site and surroundings, identifying environmental cues and features pertinent to the security of the proposed development".

- Visual audit completed by Alex Swanson of Hatari Global Solutions on 13th March 2023.

"Formal consultation with relevant stakeholders, including the local DOCO, ALO (Architectural Liaison Officer), CPDA (Crime Prevention Design Advisor) & CTSA (Counter Terrorism Security Advisor) (as applicable), in order to obtain a summary of crime and disorder issues in the immediate vicinity of the proposed development".

- Hatari consulted with the local police Designing Out Crime Officer (DOCO), Kris Calderhead, whose team will review this report once issued. Kris Calderhead was consulted on 15th March 2023.
- Crime and disorder issues were also assessed using publicly available data (see Annex A).

"Identify risks specific to the proposed, likely or potential use of the building(s)"

- Described in the appropriate section of this report.

"Identify risks specific to the proposed, likely or potential user groups of the building(s)"

- Described in the appropriate section of this report.

"Identify any detrimental effects the development may have on the existing community".

- Described in the appropriate section of this report.

"The recommendations or solutions proposed by the SQSS are implemented".

- To be confirmed by the BREEAM Assessor on completion of the project.

Site Location & Surroundings

The current site incorporates 2 Asian Street Food outlets with an unused building in between. The new development façade will front Summerland Street, it's flanks Red Lion and Verney Streets, and the rear of the development will border a residential block to the north-east.

Fig 01 - Site location and development

The plot is surrounded by new student developments, terraced housing, high street retail and commercial facilities including a garage and night club within 50 feet to the south-east of the site. Outside of that immediate vicinity are Exeter town centre features including cinemas, a rail transport hub, museums and places of worship. The University of Exeter campus sits a kilometre to the north-west of the site.

The scheme proposes the demolition and clearance of the existing buildings within the boundary designated in Fig 01. The redevelopment is a 6 story mixed use residence with a roof terrace, with a gym, co-working and multi-functional space on the ground level.

Current design provides for a main entrance and 2 side entrances leading to Reception lobby's and internal stairwells.

Security Recommendations

This section describes measures which Hatari recommend providing proportionate protection to the Summerland Street redevelopment and to support the future requirements of the occupants and managers of the facility.

Site Perimeter

Fig 02 shows the proposed boundary and secure line for the new development. The building façade will form the perimeter of the new scheme; there is no scope of perimeter fencing or the need for use of controlled gates through a secure perimeter fence. As such, greater importance must be placed on the access systems and protocols to enable authorised access into the new premises.

Building access at ground level will be enabled from neighbouring streets at several points:

- Main Entrance (Summerland Street)
- Cycle Store (Verney Street)
- HV/LV Rooms (Verney Street)
- Gym or Co-Working Space (Verney Street)
- Bins Space (Red Lion Lane)



Fig 02 – Main Entrance and Restricted Areas

Observations & Recommendations

- The main doors to building Reception must be electronically accessed controlled to prevent unauthorised access from Summerland Street and to complement the secure line along the entirety of the building perimeter.
- The doors to the Cycle store, HV/LV rooms and Gym should be electronically accessed controlled with restricted access permission to selected user groups/profiles to prevent unauthorised access from Verney Street
- Signage should be considered to notify the public that the site is private property to mitigate trespass and unauthorised use building entrances.
- There is no scope for fencing/railings or gates which places the onus on building perimeter security systems to monitor and identify unauthorised access to the building set out above.

Proposed Site Access

The site will be accessible for pedestrians through a single entry/egress main entrance on the southern boundary with Summerland Street. The Cycle store and Gym will be accessed from Verney Street for authorised users. Building occupants will require credentials (access card, badge or fob) to gain authorised access into the building. Cycle store, Gym and Co-Working users should have additional access permissions added to their access credentials once approved. External access should be restricted to the HV/LV rooms, and internally to Plant rooms, and access permissions approved by exception.

There is no scope of any vehicle access in the scheme.

Observation/Recommendation:

It is recommended that design considerations include:

- Building occupants will require credentials (access card, badge, or fob) to gain authorised access into the building.
- Cycle store and Gym users should have additional access permissions added to their access credentials once approved.
- External access should be restricted to the HV/LV rooms, and internally to Plant rooms, and access permissions approved by exception.
- Lighting provisions at site access points and internal roadways and footpaths should conform to the requirements set out in the preceding section of this report.

Other Access

Current plans do not include a dedicated goods entrance, waste, or maintenance access for vehicles. Bin collection will be enabled from Red Lion Lane without access needed to the remainder of the development. It is assumed that all mail and courier deliveries will be managed via the reception.

Provisions detailed in the Access Control section below provide suitable mitigation for risks associated with unauthorised access related to maintenance and servicing activities.

Observation/Recommendation:

- Refuse stores should be locked and ideally fully enclosed to deter criminality and rough sleeping. Installation of card readers would benefit the management of these facilities, but a mechanical locking system would support general security requirements.
- Access controlled doors should be augmented and supported by managed and assured operational procedures to ensure that adequate controls are in place for service suppliers and temporary contractors.
- Adequate lighting should be provided to the access points of refuse areas to support CCTV requirements as well as providing suitable levels of illumination for residents and staff using the facility at night.

Lighting

To deter crime and anti-social behaviour at Summerland Street the design should ensure that suitable external and internal illumination is provided. The lighting for access roads, pedestrian routes and cycle lanes should be compliant with the external lighting criteria defined in Hea 01 Visual comfort, i.e., in accordance with BS 5489-1:2020 Lighting of roads and public amenity areas.

Doorways and recesses should be illuminated. Consider using detector activated lighting if this is possible without causing a nuisance to residents or neighbours. All e BS 5489-1:2020 xternal doors should have opaque, vandal resistant, compact fluorescent bulkhead lights, operated by photo-electric cells fixed above them at the highest inaccessible points. No switch should be fitted. Particular attention should be paid to the main pedestrian and exit points, the Gym entrance, Cycle store entrance, Bin/refuse area, and external entrances to other restricted rooms.

All internal corridors and access routes to them should be fitted with lighting to ensure they are lit all times or when in use, potentially through a detector activated system to minimise energy consumption.

Physical Security - Building Envelope

Doors & Windows

Main entry doors, secondary entry points, fire exits, and ground floor windows should be certified to at least PAS 24:2022, or BS EN 1627 RC2, or SR1/2 would provide an acceptable alternative. The developer should provide electronically access controlled external doors, including reception lobby doors, with electromechanical locks rather than electromagnetic where possible. Electromechanical locks provide greater resistance to forced entry and manipulation.

All individual Studio doors should be certified to at least PAS 24:2022, or BS EN 1627 RC2, or SR1/2 and fitted with mechanical locks, door viewers ('spy holes') and door chains as a minimum requirement. Hatari would encourage the developer to consider the benefits of installing electronic access control to all Studio doors. Security card or SMART phone enabled locking systems offer significantly enhanced security levels

as well as offering non-security benefits such as reduced management administration (key loss, key management, lock changes etc) and improved energy efficiency (through integration with lighting and heating systems).

Windows & Glazing

Ground floor windows should be fitted with a restrictor to an opening aperture maximum 100 mm to limit access from outside the building (whilst still allowing them to remain open) and they should be fitted with a suitable key locking system. Retail unit windows should use minimum 6.8mm laminated glazing, whilst all glazing to doors shall be laminated to a minimum 7.5mm thickness.

The developer should provide a minimum laminated glass build up to accessible areas of the building's facade to a standard capable of providing a moderate level of resistance to forced entry. Ground floor windows should be fitted with privacy film or suitable forms of blinds to retain privacy levels for occupants.

Access Control

To facilitate legitimate access to accommodation, co-living, and recreational/commercial space, and to reduce the risk of intrusion occurring through deception, tailgating etc, a layered access control system should be provided. For all Studio accommodation, scheme designs should include the requirement for all personnel to pass through a minimum of 2 access controlled doors before accessing these units.

Fig 03 – Ground floor access points

Compartmentalisation is to be utilised to protect the amenity of residents. This will control the access from building central cores, lifts and stairwells where each resident is assigned access to the floor on which their dwelling is located via the use of a proximity reader, swipe card or key or door sets on each landing and can prevent unauthorised access to the corridor where their Studio is located.

To support a managed access regime to all areas including co-living and recreational or commercial space, for residents, visitors, building management and contractors, an automated access control system should be installed. Amongst those user groups, and at the point of commissioning access control systems, the management team should have a robust system in place that categorises the different access groups and assigns permissions to credentials (access cards/badges/fobs etc) accordingly. These processes must be interlinked with enrolment databases so that authorised credentials are allocated (and removed) to access group as part of onboarded/offboarding procedures.

This report identifies areas of the scheme that should be supported by this electronic access control system (EACS) but also where mechanical locking systems are a suitable alternative means of providing controlled access at doors to secure areas. The EACS should be managed and administrated by the building operator from a single secure area/office/control room facility. The following specific provisions are recommended in relation to controlled access at Summerland Street:

Building External Access Controls

- All Building perimeters
    - Building primary entrance door – EACS card reader and intercom linked to on-site security/management.
    - Secondary building entry points - EACS card reader. If also fire escape doors should be installed with local sounders to make residents and staff aware if doors left open.
    - Cycle store - EACS card reader.
    - HV substation - EACS card reader or mechanical lock/key (depending on plant criticality)
    - LV equipment room - EACS card reader or mechanical lock/key (depending on plant criticality)
    - Refuse / bin area – mechanical lock.

Building Internal Access Controls

- Ground Level:
    - Access from main entrance Reception Lobby – EACS card reader for the following controlled doors:
        - Door to internal corridor (Co-Working Space)
        - Door to internal corridor (Gym / Multi-Function space)
        - Door to Residents Lounge
    - Access from side entrances (Verney Street) – EACS card reader for the following controlled doors:
        - Door to Lift Lobby
        - Door to Cycle Store

    - Access from side entrances (Red Lion Lane) – EACS card reader for the following controlled doors:
        - Door to Lift Lobby
        - Door to TV Snug
        - Door to The Common Room
    - Access to other internal rooms – EACS card reader
        - Staff office (dual authentication recommended)
        - Post store
        - Luggage store
        - Gym
        - Multi-function space
        - Segregated Co-Working space (depending on requirements for use)
    - Access to other amenity / social spaces – mechanical lock

- Upper Levels:
    - Access to Studio accommodation corridors – EACS card reader (from lift lobbies and from stairwells)
    - Access from roof terrace to 6th floor – EACS card reader
    - Access to Kitchens/Lounges - mechanical lock

- Restricted Areas - Activities and assets contained within some areas of the buildings warrant additional restriction to access. A review of the existing designs has identified the areas listed below as requiring controlled access:
    - Data Room – EACS card reader (dual authentication recommended)
    - Plant rooms:
        - Sprinkler Room – mechanical lock or EACS card reader
        - Mechanical Plant Room – mechanical lock or EACS card reader
    - Riser cupboards (all floors) - mechanical lock.
    - Cleaners Stores and other storage (all floors) - mechanical lock.

Video Surveillance Systems

To deter crime and support the investigation of incidents in and around the Summerland Street development, provision of a video surveillance system is recommended. As a general principle, CCTV should be proportionately installed across Summerland Street to provide:

- Detection of unauthorised activities
- Deterrence of criminal, antisocial or other unauthorised or undesirable activities
- Post incident investigation support

With these requirements in mind, CCTV cameras should be installed to provide surveillance of the following areas:

- Building Façade:

- Main entrance - locate and specify a camera such that a person using card readers can be clearly identified.
- Secondary entrances - locate and specify a camera such that a person using card readers can be clearly identified.
- Ground floor windows - Locate and specify cameras to provide wide area coverage of ground floor windows. These cameras may be dual purpose if opportunities exist for them to cover other external surveillance requirements as listed in the section below.
- Access to Cycle Store
- Access to HV/LV Plant rooms - locate and specify a camera such that a person using card readers can be clearly identified.
- Access to Bin area (consider use of camera to identify unauthorised use of this area)

- Buildings internal areas
  - Locate and specify a camera(s) within the side door area (Verney Street) to capture images of all pedestrians using the door to the lobby and to the Cycle store
  - Locate and specify a camera(s) within the side door area (Red Lion Lane) to capture images of all pedestrians using the door to the lobby and to the TV Snug and to the Common Room.
  - Locate and specify a camera to capture images of all pedestrians using the door to the Data room and Staff Office
  - Consider use of cameras to capture images of personnel using the following controlled space:
    - Gym
    - Multi-Function space
    - Co-Living space
    - Luggage & Post store

- Vertical Transportation
  - Optional recommendation - CCTV may be installed inside lifts to act as a deterrent to property damage and to support incidences of entrapment.

Intruder & Duress Alarms

An Intruder alarm system should be installed, integrated with Access Control CCTV systems, and monitored either onsite or offsite for unauthorised intruder events. Monitoring the state of all electronic access-controlled doors should be considered:

- All Building perimeter access controlled doors
- All Ground and Upper level access controlled doors
- All Restricted Areas access controlled doors including Data & Plant Rooms

A duress (panic) alarm system should be provided at the Reception desk of the building, monitored by an onsite or third-party alarm receiving centre, and should direct a Police or keyholder response. The duress alarm should be used by reception or security staff in the event of a serious incident in the building.

Reception Areas and Management Office Design

The following design requirements should be considered in relation to reception areas and management offices with Summerland Street. These will support safety, security and data protection requirements and will provide the building operator with a level of flexibility regarding managing administrative requirements during both the working day and at night-time.

Reception – An open plan design should be avoided. Ideally, a design that allows access to the reception area to be controlled and for the facility to be locked down during non-operational times should be adopted, as illustrated in the example shown in the diagram below. This will ensure that equipment and data stored in the reception area can be appropriately secured. Furthermore, it will allow for screens used to monitor CCTV to be installed in compliance with GDPR requirements, ensuring that they are only visible to authorised personnel.

Fig 04 – Illustration of recommended reception design

Management Offices - Adoption of design like Fig 04 may also allow for reception areas and management offices to be co-located. This offers design efficiencies from a space utilisation perspective and is also likely to generate operational and staffing efficiencies.

If management offices will regularly store significant volumes of cash, the following design requirements should also be considered:

- External walls should be a layered/sandwich construction, i.e., Brick, weld mesh, brick, plywood and/or breezeblock.
- A solid core door to at least LPS 1175 SR 2 with a door viewer should be installed. The door should be covered by CCTV coverage.
- Access to the room should not be possible from an external door.
- A panic/duress button as part of the security system should also be included.

Safes should be located within the management offices or secure location. Safes should be capable of being bolted securely to the floor. Safes should also be too large in weight and size to be removed by a single individual.

Annex A: Crime and Disorder Risk Assessment

This assessment is generated from open-source research of local crime patterns in and around central Exeter, and after consultation with the Devon and Cornwall Police Designing Out Crime Officer (DOCO) team on 15th March 2023.

Crime and Disorder Risk Summary

Exeter is statistically the most dangerous major town in Devon and is among the top 20 most dangerous overall out of Devon's 403 towns, villages, and cities. The overall crime rate in Exeter in 2022 was 61 crimes per 1,000 people. This compares poorly to Devon's overall crime rate, coming in 32% higher than the Devon rate of 46 per 1,000 residents. However, for England, Wales, and Northern Ireland as a whole, Exeter is among the top 10 safest major towns, and the 2,548th most dangerous location out of all towns, cities, and villages[1]. In November 2022, Exeter had the worst crime rate in Devon for bicycle theft. The most common crimes in Exeter are violence and sexual offences, with 3,512 offences during 2022. This is 11% lower than 2021's figure of 3,928 offences. Exeter's least common crime is robbery, with 34 offences recorded in 2022, a decrease of 45% from 2021's figure of 62 crimes.



The Exeter City Centre 'policing neighbourhood' area is a typical urban centre with a mixed commercial, residential and public service areas, and in the immediate vicinity of the proposed new development, a number of new student accommodation due to the proximity of the University of Exeter. Of interest is the location of Unit 1 nightclub on the corner of Summerland Street and Verney Street, which elevates the risks of violence and sexual offences anti-social behaviour, particularly during weekends. The development of a new co-living residence (young graduates, key workers, and young professionals) could raise a profile which may attract criminals' intent on theft of high value personal assets or become of interest to those intent on anti-social behaviour. Given the immediate location of the proposed

[1] CrimeRate – Crime and Safety in Exeter

development amongst residential and normal high street facilities there is a very low risk that protest, or public disorder directed at these facilities might impact the operation of the site.

Local Crime and Disorder Overview

Police statistics consider Summerland Street to be within the Exeter 'policing neighbourhood' area Exeter City Centre | Police.uk (www.police.uk)). Available open-source data for both 12-month and 3-year periods show a consistent trend in crime of all types, albeit fluctuating in crime levels and at a lower rate to usual urban centres. Crime is in the most part is centred in the city centre in Exeter. Historic information accessible on www.police.uk reveals the dominant types of crime and disorder events over the last 12 months in Exeter, in order of frequency, were: violence and sexual offences, antisocial behaviour, shoplifting, public order, criminal damage & arson, other theft.

Crime Levels Overview[2]

For the last 12 months (from Feb 2022 to Jan 2022)



For the last 3 years (from Apr 2020 to Dec 2022)



Crime Type Description

For the last 12 months (from Feb 2022 to Jan 2023)



For the last 3 years (from Mar 2020 to Jan 2022)



Our assessment is that this low level of crime is likely to persist given the nature of the local area. Of all crime trends violence and sexual offences has remained the most consistent over the last 3 years and must be considered when access management systems and procedures are incorporated into design and build stages.

[2] No data available between Nov 22 and Jan 23 on police.uk website

Annex B: Terrorism Risk Assessment

Terrorism Risk Summary

Whilst the terrorist threat level remains at SUBSTANTIAL (an attack is likely) we have found no reason to believe that the proposed Summerland Street development or neighbourhood is a direct terrorist target. Despite occurrences of terrorists targeting a broad range of urban locations, these tend to be higher profile and with a denser population.

There is a very low risk of a lone actor terrorist or similar presenting a threat to the Summerland Street development; this is not sufficiently high to warrant specific preventative measures beyond what would normally be provided for mixed use facilities. Furthermore, there is a very low likelihood that facilities or institutions in the surrounding areas are at risk of a terrorist attack.

Marauding Terrorist Attack (MTA)

Terrorist attacks in the UK have displayed a trend of using bladed weapons or a vehicle as a weapon from which to launch attacks in crowded places. A terrorist attack based on the use of firearms remains unlikely in the UK due to the lack of availability of firearms and ammunition.

The probability of a direct marauding terrorist attack towards a mixed-use development is highly unlikely. It is possible that an attack on any neighbouring transport infrastructure, businesses, government, or religious buildings could have a very minor, indirect effect on the operation of the building. However, such events are still considered to be highly unlikely, and these types of institutions or facilities are not in the immediate vicinity of Summerland Street.

Given the MTA modus operandi in crowded places by terrorists in the UK over the last 5 years, at the point of occupancy the building operator should ensure building lockdown procedures are incorporated.

Direct MTA:

Probability	*Consequence*	*Risk Rating*
Highly Unlikely	*Extreme*	*Low*

Indirect MTA:

Probability	*Consequence*	*Risk Rating*
Highly Unlikely	*Major*	*Low*

Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED)

There is no known direct VBIED terrorist threat to Summerland Street or institutions, such as the University of Exeter, or other facilities or groups in the vicinity of the development. Therefore, it is considered that the probability of a direct VBIED attack is highly unlikely.

Direct VBIED attack:

Probability	*Consequence*	*Risk Rating*
Highly Unlikely	*Extreme*	*Low*

Indirect VBIED attack:

Probability	*Consequence*	*Risk Rating*
Highly Unlikely	*Moderate*	*Very Low*

Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED)

There is no known direct PBIED terrorist threat to Summerland Street or institutions, such as the University of Exeter, or other facilities or groups in the vicinity of the development.

Direct PBIED attack:

Probability	*Consequence*	*Risk Rating*
Highly Unlikely	*Extreme*	*Low*

Indirect PBIED attack:

Probability	*Consequence*	*Risk Rating*
Highly Unlikely	*Moderate*	*Very Low*

Annex C - Qualifications and Experience

Security Consultant Alex Swanson, of Hatari Global Solutions Ltd, acted as Suitably Qualified Security Specialist for the completion of this BREEAM Security Needs Assessment.

BREEAM Hea 06 SQSS Criteria	**Hatari Consulting SQSS Alex Swanson**
Minimum of three years relevant experience within the last five years. This experience must clearly demonstrate a practical understanding of factors affecting security in relation to construction and the built environment, relevant to the type and scale of the project being undertaken.	25 years continuous experience in public and private sector defence and security settings with MOD, market leading security & risk management consultancies and as part of large, blue-chip, and Government major event security team. Extensive commercial property project experience in the UK. Project portfolio available on request.
Holds a suitable qualification relevant to security.	Post-Graduate degree in International Relations, Defence & International Affairs modular qualifications from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and Defence College, Shrivenham. PRINCE2 (Project Management) Practitioner
Maintains (full) membership to a relevant professional body or accreditation scheme that meets the following: Has a professional code of conduct, to which members must adhere; and ongoing membership is subject to peer review.	Full membership of The Security Institute. https://www.security-institute.org/home_page